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VEB-1 extended-spectrum β-lactamase–producing
Acinetobacter baumannii was responsible for an outbreak
in hospitals in France. A national alert was triggered in
September 2003 when 4 hospitals reported clusters of A.
baumannii infection with similar susceptibility profiles. Case
definitions and laboratory guidelines were disseminated,
and prospective surveillance was implemented; strains
were sent to a single laboratory for characterization and
typing. From April 2003 through June 2004, 53 hospitals
reported 290 cases of A. baumannii infection or coloniza-
tion; 275 isolates were blaVEB-1-positive and clonally relat-
ed. Cases were first reported in 5 districts of northern
France, then in 10 other districts in 4 regions. Within a
region, interhospital spread was associated with patient
transfer. In northern France, investigation and control
measures led to a reduction of reported cases after
January 2004. The national alert enabled early control of
new clusters, demonstrating the usefulness of early warn-
ing about antimicrobial drug resistance.
D
uring the past decade, nosocomial outbreaks of
Acinetobacter baumannii have been described with
increasing frequency, occurring mostly in intensive care
units, burn units, and surgical wards (1,2). Epidemic
strains of A. baumannii are often resistant to several
antimicrobial drugs, which reduces treatment effective-
ness. Nosocomial transmission is from patient to patient
and associated with environmental reservoirs (2). Several
risk factors for A. baumannii infections have been identi-
fied and include severity of underlying disease, duration of
hospitalization, invasive procedures, and prior broad-spec-
trum antimicrobial drug therapy (2–4). A. baumannii can
be detected in patients without infection (i.e., colonization)
or as the source in patients with severe infections; the case-
fatality ratio varies from 17% to 46% for septicemia and
can be as high as 70% for pneumonia (1).
A. baumannii is not the most common antimicrobial
drug–resistant pathogen in hospitalized patients; it
accounted for 1.2% of all nosocomial infections in 2001 in
France (5). However, increasing therapeutic difficulty
caused by resistance is a serious concern (6–9). A variety
of molecular mechanisms for resistance to broad-spectrum
β-lactams have been reported in A. baumannii, such as
mutations of penicillin-binding proteins and alterations of
membrane permeability, but the most common mechanism
is attributed to the presence of β-lactamases encoded by
either chromosomes or plasmids (2,10,11). Several class A,
B, and D β-lactamases (2,8) as well as chromosome-medi-
ated cephalosporinases (12) confer various resistance phe-
notypes. Moreover, extended-spectrum β-lactamase
(ESBL)–producing A. baumannii strains have also been
described: PER-1 in Turkey, Korea, and France (13–15);
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initially detected in Enterobacteriaceae and Pseudomonas
aeruginosa from Southeast Asia (18–20). Subsequently, it
has been described in clonally related A. baumannii iso-
lates recovered during an outbreak that lasted 9 months
(August 2001–April 2002) in the intensive care unit of a
hospital in northern France (4,16). In these strains, the
location of the blaVEB-1 gene on the chromosomes and inte-
grons was identified (4,16). One year after this outbreak
was controlled, nosocomial infections with this A. bau-
mannii strain reemerged in the same area and subsequent-
ly spread to hospitals located in other districts in France.
We describe the nationwide spread of this strain from April
2003 through June 2004.
In early September 2003, an alert was triggered through
the national nosocomial infection notification system
when, within a month, 4 hospitals in a single district
(Nord) reported 5 clusters of A. baumannii infections with
a similar susceptibility profile; all A. baumannii strains
were confirmed positive for VEB-1. In October 2003, the
National Institute of Public Health (Institut de Veille
Sanitaire [InVS]) alerted all hospitals in France of the
emergence of this VEB-1–producing A. baumannii strain,
disseminated case definitions and laboratory guidelines,




A probable case was defined as follows: isolation of an
A. baumannii strain showing a multidrug-resistance profile
similar to that of the 2001 outbreak strain, susceptible to
only imipenem and colistin (strain AYE [16]), from a
patient hospitalized in France between April 1, 2003, and
June 30, 2004; only 1 isolate per patient was retained for
the study period. A confirmed case was defined as a case
for which VEB-1 ESBLproduction had been confirmed by
the central laboratory, which used phenotypic (detection of
the synergy image) and genotypic (PCR amplification of
the blaVEB-1 gene) methods. Infection or colonization was
ascertained by clinicians according to national case defini-
tions for nosocomial infections adapted from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (21).
Epidemiologic Investigation
Case definitions were dispatched to hospital laborato-
ries and infection control units. Cases had to be reported to
regional infection control coordinating centers (CCLIN)
(22) and local health departments through the national
nosocomial infection notification system. In this system,
implemented in August 2001, baseline reporting require-
ments use specific criteria; 1 of them is about rare microor-
ganisms, depending on virulence and antimicrobial drug
susceptibility (23). No list of microorganisms or resistance
phenotypes exists; reports are based on the epidemiologic
knowledge of the infection control units. Hospitals report
>1 nosocomial infections on a simple form, which summa-
rizes cases and investigations and allows hospitals to
request assistance when needed. For the purpose of this
investigation, this system was reinforced as hospitals were
asked to report not only A. baumannii infections but also
instances of colonization and to send bacterial strains to a
central laboratory. All reported cases were investigated by
infection control units, local health departments, and
CCLIN, the latter offering on-site assistance to hospitals
when needed. Data on all cases were centralized and ana-
lyzed by InVS, which coordinated the investigation
through the Nosocomial Infection Early Warning,
Investigation and Surveillance Network (Réseau d’Alerte,
d’Investigation et de Surveillance des Infections
Nosocomiale [RAISIN]), a partnership between InVS and
CCLIN.
Microbiologic Investigation
All isolates of A. baumannii were recovered from rou-
tine clinical specimens (from blood and catheters, urine,
respiratory tract, skin, and wounds) and from colonization
samples (from axillary, pharyngeal, or rectal swabs), iden-
tified by standard techniques at local laboratories, then
sent for confirmatory testing to a central laboratory
(University Hospital of Bicêtre, K.-Bicêtre, France).
Identification was confirmed by using the API 32GN
system (bioMérieux, Marcy-l’Etoile, France). A. bauman-
nii strains were also tested for the ability to grow at 44°C
in Trypticase soy broth (Oxoid, Unipath Ltd, Basingstoke,
UK).
Routine antibiograms were determined by the disk dif-
fusion method on Mueller-Hinton agar (BioRad, Marnes-
La-Coquette, France) and interpreted as recommended by
the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (formerly
NCCLS) (24). The presence of ESBLwas shown by a syn-
ergy image created by using the double-disk synergy test
with cefepime, ceftazidime, and ticarcillin-clavulanic acid
disks on Mueller-Hinton agar plates (16,18). Synergy
images were best seen when plates were incubated at
25°C. Alternatively, double-disk synergy tests were also
performed on plates containing cloxacillin (200 µg/mL)
(16). Analytic isoelectric focusing was performed with an
ampholine polyacrylamide gel (18).
Molecular Investigation
Genomic DNAand plasmid extractions and electropora-
tion of plasmid extracts into Escherichia coli DH10B were
performed (16). Half of A. baumannii isolates from the 4
largest hospitals of 2 districts were randomly selected
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from other districts were analyzed by pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis (PFGE), using ApaI (Amersham Biosciences,
Les Ulis, France) (4). ApaI-macrorestriction patterns were
digitized and analyzed with Taxotron software (Institut
Pasteur, Paris, France) and interpreted according to
Tenover et al. (25).
PCR-based amplification of class 1 integron structures
and of blaVEB-1 gene and subsequent sequencing of the
blaVEB-1 gene were performed as described (19).
Automated sequencing reactions were performed with the
same blaVEB-1-specific primers (ABI Prism 3100; Applied
Biosystems, Les Ullis, France).
Results
Epidemiologic Investigation
From April 1, 2004, to June 30, 2004, 53 hospitals (41
tertiary care and 12 long-term care facilities) located in 15
districts reported 290 probable cases, of which 275 (95%)
were confirmed. Of the 290 probable cases, 255 (88%)
were reported through 116 mandatory notifications, and 35
(12%) were identified through strains directly sent for
characterization without notification. The 2 first notifica-
tions occurred at the end of July (2 clusters totaling 15
cases) and were followed by 3 other notifications in early
September (3 clusters totaling 8 cases). The monthly num-
ber of reported cases peaked in October 2003 and again in
January 2004 (after intense media coverage of the out-
break); it gradually declined after this date, until the alert
was canceled in June 2004 (Figure 1).
Cases were first reported in the Nord district and in 4
other contiguous districts, then later in 10 districts in 4
noncontiguous regions. Most reporting hospitals and cases
were in 2 adjacent districts (59 and 62 on Figure 2A). The
date of case diagnosis indicated that the strain had been
circulating since April 2003 in 5 districts of northern
France before the outbreak was recognized (Table 1).
Spread of this multidrug-resistant strain was mediated
by large referring hospitals. Among 116 notifications, 20%
came from regional teaching hospitals, 45% from public
general hospitals, 15% from smaller private hospitals, and
20% from long-term care facilities; most affected wards
were intensive care units (54 notifications, 47%), medical
wards (55 notifications, 47%), reeducation and long-term
care wards (24 notifications, 21%), and surgical wards (13
notifications, 11%). In 3 regions (northern France,
Toulouse-Montpellier, Lyon), investigations suggested that
frequent patient transfers between hospitals within the
same healthcare network could explain the diffusion of the
strain (4,26). In northern France (Nord and Pas de Calais
districts), among 33 hospitals reporting >1 cases, 22 (67%)
had an index case directly admitted from a previously
affected facility (Figure 2B); however, no such link could
be established from 1 region to another.
Of the 217 (71%) cases with clinical documentation, 73
(33%) were infections and 144 (67%) were colonizations.
The sources of the clinical isolates were as follows: respi-
ratory tract (33%), skin and wounds (33%), urine (21%),
catheters and blood (8%), and others (5%). By the time of
notification, 34 (12%) patients had died; however, investi-
gations in northern France suggested that only 17% of the
reported deaths were related to the A. baumannii infection.
At several participating hospitals, environmental sur-
faces were swabbed for culture and found to be positive for
VEB-1-producing A. baumannii; the organism was partic-
ularly prevalent on bed rails and respiratory equipment
(data not shown) and, at 1 hospital, was also found on
blood pressure cuffs (27).
Microbiologic Investigation
The antibiogram of VEB-1 ESBL–producing A. bau-
mannii strains was similar for 275 (95%) of the 290 prob-
able cases; the level of resistance to aminoglycosides
varied slightly. A synergy image, signature of the presence
of an ESBL, could not be observed between clavulanic
acid and cefepime or ceftazidime disks on a routine antibi-
ogram (Figure 3A) unless cloxacillin-containing plates
that inhibit cephalosporinase activity were used (Figure
3B). Alternatively, incubation of the antibiogram at room
temperature enhanced the identification of the synergy
image (Figure 3C, D). One strain isolated in the Alpes-
Maritimes district, next to Nice, was also resistant to col-
istin. All strains remained susceptible to imipenem.
Of the 288 A. baumannii isolates, 275 (95%) contained
the blaVEB-1 gene, according to PCR analysis, which shows
a perfect correlation between the antibiogram and the PCR
results. All but 2 notifying hospitals isolated the outbreak
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Figure 1. Number of VEB-1–producing Acinetobacter baumannii
cases, by month of report, France, July 2003–May 2004 (N = 255).strain in their wards; for 1 hospital in Isère and 1 in Tarn,
the isolate was not available for confirmatory testing.
Genotyping by PFGE showed that all VEB-1 A. bauman-
nii isolates were clonally related to each other and to the
strain responsible for the 2001 outbreak (strain AYE [16]).
Although most strains belonged to several subtypes of a
given type, differing by only 1 or 2 bands, several strains
were more distantly related and belonged to a different
type. However, these isolates could be related to the main
epidemic strains as illustrated on the dendrogram (Figure
4). The epidemic strain isolated in the southern part of the
country differed from those in the northern part by at least
3 bands, and thus forms a separate cluster.
The sequence of blaVEB-1 gene and its genetic environ-
ment were identical to those previously published for A.
baumannii strain AYE (16,18). Finally, the chromosomal
position of the integron was verified for 20 isolates ran-
domly chosen in the different regions.
Control Measures
Recommendations for surveillance and control were
disseminated to all hospitals (through specific postings on
the InVS Web site and email from CCLIN to infection con-
trol units and laboratories) and then implemented by infec-
tion control units. Based on international guidelines (28,
Table 2), the recommendations included the usual standard
and contact precautions for limiting the spread of this
pathogen within a hospital but added systematic screening
in wards at high risk (e.g., intensive care units) and appro-
priate antimicrobial drug use. In addition, specific recom-
mendations were dispatched to limit the spread of the
strain from 1 hospital to another; hospitals were asked to
report cases to local health departments and CCLIN, to
limit patient admissions, and to inform other hospitals
about infected or colonized patients before transferring
them (2 hospitals even closed their wards to new patients).
Discussion
This is the first report of a clonal ESBL-producing A.
baumannii outbreak that was nationwide. It was traced in
53 hospitals, initially in northern France and later in 4 dis-
tant regions. Recognition of the outbreak and effective
tracing of new cases was facilitated by several factors.
First, in August 2001, a national nosocomial infection noti-
fication system based on specific reporting criteria, includ-
ing unusual antimicrobial drug resistance profiles, was
implemented in France (23). The system relies on hospital
infection control units and is coordinated at the regional
level by CCLIN created in 1992 (22) and at the national
level by InVS, which enables events of national impor-
tance to be detected. Second, the French healthcare system
is organized around large public, university, or regional
tertiary care hospitals that serve an entire region. These
hospitals include medical microbiology laboratories that
are well connected to other laboratories in smaller public
hospitals, therefore enabling prompt dissemination of lab-
oratory guidelines. Third, the outbreak strain had a unique
susceptibility profile that enabled effective screening of A.
baumannii strains in hospital laboratories and referral to a
central laboratory for confirmatory testing. This laboratory
provided immediate feedback (<48 hours after strains were
received) to hospitals, which facilitated prompt adaptation
of local control measures, and to CCLIN and InVS, which
enabled regular tracing of the strain dissemination and
adaptation of recommendations.
Two factors make emergence of panresistant isolates
through mutations in porins (11) or acquisition of plasmid-
encoded carbapenemases (8), such as the blaOXA-58 gene
(28), a concern. First, there may be no option but to treat
patients infected with A. baumannii, particularly in the
intensive care setting, because A. baumannii infection is
associated with a higher case-fatality ratio in critically ill
VEB-1–producing Acinetobacter baumannii, France
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Figure 2. A) Hospitals reporting VEB-1–producing Acinetobacter
baumannii, by district, France, April 2003–May 2004 (N = 53).
Each district is identified with a number (same numbers used in
Table 1). B) Interhospital spread in northern France. Circles repre-
sent affected hospitals; the sizes are proportional to the number of
reported cases. patients (3,4,29,30). Second, carbapenems were the last
molecules active against A. baumannii VEB-1 isolates.
Antimicrobial drug susceptibility of A. baumannii VEB-1
isolates remained relatively stable; all tested strains were
fully susceptible to carbapenems and all but 1 was suscep-
tible to colistin. The slight variations in their aminoglyco-
side susceptibilities reflected presumably different
antimicrobial drug selection pressures in some of the hos-
pitals.
Early warning and investigations of reported cases
alerted all hospitals of the need for rapid identification and
reporting of cases. Furthermore, early warning enabled
timely assistance for implementing effective control meas-
ures. These investigations showed that the epidemic clone
was already endemic in some hospitals, which suggests
that once the strain is introduced into a hospital, eradicat-
ing it may be difficult. Early recognition of its presence
and prompt implementation of strict infection control
measures are therefore necessary to prevent its further
spread and establishment of endemicity. Moreover, when
several hospitals in the same network are affected by the
same clone, coordinated measures must be implemented to
effectively reduce its spread, as demonstrated for other
multidrug-resistant bacteria such as vancomycin-resistant
enterococci (31).
In this national investigation, spread within hospitals
was not explored because it has been well described in the
literature (3,4,26,27). While we reinforced the implemen-
tation of standard and contact precautions in affected hos-
pitals, we recommended that other hospitals be informed
(by flagged records) when infected or colonized patients
are transferred to them. In some hospitals, fast-spreading
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Figure 3. Extended-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL) laboratory identification. Usefulness of double-disk synergy test with blaVEB-1-positive
Acinetobacter baumannii strain on Mueller-Hinton agar plates with clavulanate as inhibitor. The disks tested contained ticarcillin + clavu-
lanate (TCC), amoxicillin + clavulanate (AMC), moxalactam (MOX), ceftazidime (CAZ), and cefepime (FEP). A) Standard disk diffusion
as recommended by Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute at 37°C (98°F). B) Standard disk diffusion on cloxacillin-containing
Mueller-Hinton plates at 37°C (98°F). Cloxacillin inhibits partially the naturally occurring cephalosporinase (AmpC) from A. baumannii,
thus enabling easier detection of possible ESBL phenotypes. C) Standard disk diffusion at 25°C (77°F). D) Standard disk diffusion at 25°C
(77°F) when AMC and FEP disks were brought closer. The presence of ESBL was shown by a synergy image, as indicated with the
arrows. ESBL presence was best seen on cloxacillin-containing (B) plates or at reduced growth temperature (D).clusters associated with deaths led to the closure of inten-
sive care units; however, the effectiveness of such a meas-
ure needs further evaluation because transfer of these
patients enhances the dissemination of the strain (4). In
other hospitals, the prompt and strict application of barrier
precautions, without closure of the intensive care unit,
effectively controlled the outbreak.
Clones may emerge at different locations by independ-
ent selection of genetically related, circulating strains in
the community or environment as a result of antibiotic use
in hospitals (2,8,32,33). Otherwise, similar isolates may
appear at different locations simply through direct spread
from 1 hospital to another. Results of this investigation
suggest that regional spread of the organism was mediated
by patient transfers within regional healthcare networks.
However, the appearance of the organism in hospitals in
southern France, Lyon (central France), and Paris is diffi-
cult to explain by simple spread. Although A. baumannii
isolates from southern and northern France were found in
Lyon, no epidemiologic link could be found, and one can-
not be sure that the cases in southern France were acquired
from contact with patients or hospitals in northern France.
Case reporting and recognition of the outbreak could have
been delayed, and the epidemic situation that we observed
might be the consequence of a spread that started earlier
than 2003, even earlier than the 2001 outbreak in
Valenciennes (4). Several facts support this hypothesis: 1)
blaVEB-1 gene was characterized in 1996 in an E. coli strain
isolated from a Vietnamese child hospitalized in France
(18) and then in 2001 in an A. baumannii strain (16); 2) the
2001 A. baumannii isolates were clonally related, but at
least 2 PFGE types had already been observed (4); 3) ret-
rospective surveys recently conducted in a few large uni-
versity hospitals in southern and northern France showed
that A. baumannii VEB-1 isolates were present as early as
January 2001 (data not shown). Finally, an alternative
explanation could be that the isolates from northern and
southern France were introduced separately into the coun-
try from an unknown common source.
The origin of this clone remains unknown because A.
baumannii VEB-1 isolates have never been reported in
other countries. All isolates were epidemiologically relat-
ed, and most of them were similar enough to be considered
as belonging to the same strain. However, the diversity of
the total set of isolates was slightly greater than what is
usually recovered in single-hospital outbreaks. Clonal dif-
fusion with several pulsotypes has already been observed
in the first A. baumannii VEB-1 outbreak described in
2001 (4). That isolates with indistinguishable PFGE pro-
files were found in many of the hospitals and that all iso-
lates had similar profiles suggest that they could be
considered relatively new, compared with older strains cir-
culating in Europe (32). Although the origin of blaVEB-1
gene is presumably countries in Southeast Asia, it would
be interesting to investigate the occurrence of such strains
in these countries. Alternatively, a European A. baumannii
strain might have acquired foreign DNA containing
blaVEB-1 through either conjugation or transformation (34).
Several multidrug-resistant A. baumannii strains have been
found to be widespread in Europe (32,33), and epidemic
carbapenem-resistant strains have been reported world-
wide (9,35–37).
This report used data only from mandatory notifica-
tions and isolates received by the central laboratory; the
full extent of this clone in France remains unknown. The
large media coverage of this outbreak in late December
2003 may have discouraged hospitals from reporting
cases; several isolates were actually sent to the central lab-
oratory without being reported. Moreover, because manda-
tory notification is not patient-based, contact tracing of
VEB-1–producing Acinetobacter baumannii, France
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Figure 4. Digitized pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) pat-
terns and phylogenetic tree of 183 VEB-1–producing
Acinetobacter baumannii isolates. Half of A. baumannii isolates
from the 4 largest hospitals of 2 districts (59 and 62) were random-
ly selected over the entire epidemic period; all isolates from small-
er hospitals or from other districts were included. The PFGE
pattern of the A. baumannii AYE reference strain previously
described is indicated in brackets (16). ApaI macrorestriction pat-
terns were digitized and analyzed with Taxotron software (Institut
Pasteur, Paris, France) to calculate Dice coefficients of correlation
and to generate a dendrogram by the unweighted pair-group
method using arithmetic averages clustering. The scale indicates
the level of pattern similarity. PFGE results were interpreted
according to the criteria of Tenover et al (25). For a given PFGE
pattern, the districts, along with the number of times a given PFGE
pattern was found, are also indicated.each patient could not be systematically performed. Data
from notifications (date of first and last case, name of
transferring facility for imported cases) enabled us to
establish only when an index patient was admitted from a
previously affected facility.
Because European countries were informed about this
outbreak through the EU Early Warning and Response
System, Belgian public health authorities were able to
detect early and control a cluster of 3 cases in a nursing
home close to the border with France (38). This clone
should therefore be considered as an issue affecting hospi-
tals not only in France but also in bordering countries, and
this situation underlines the importance of supranational
information exchange for early warning of antimicrobial
drug resistance.
Conclusion
The emergence and spread of this strain of VEB-1–pro-
ducing A. baumannii isolates are worrisome and reflect the
magnitude of antimicrobial drug resistance in France.
Most of the reported cases occurred in northern France.
The weekly number of reported cases dropped substantial-
ly after January 2004, which suggests that infection control
recommendations were effective. After the alert was
stopped in June 2004, only 12 notifications were received
by InVS until December 2005; these notifications came
from 8 hospitals (5 of them already known) and indicated
a total of 17 VEB-1–producing A. baumannii infections.
The last notification was received in May 2005, suggesting
that the national outbreak was controlled. However, after
June 2004 the notification system returned to its baseline
setting; i.e., only multidrug-resistant A. baumannii infec-
tions were to be reported. Although we are confident that
the national alert drastically helped reduce the clinical
effect of the outbreak, we cannot rule out that the strain is
still spread by colonized patients.
This study emphasizes the importance of an early
warning network comprising infection control units and
regional (CCLIN, health departments) and central (InVS
and expert laboratory) structures. The results underscore
the need for anticipating future, emerging antimicrobial
drug resistance threats by combining laboratory and
epidemiologic expertise. Early detection of emerging
resistance mechanisms usefully completes surveillance
data, which monitor the level of resistance but may miss
the emergence of new phenomena.
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